But the response was, that 1) surely there was something before God’s words; God himself perhaps. Either the “one,” and/or some essence or qualities of God. To be sure, the existence of any qualities in God, as in the “one,” before scripture and covenant or word, proves hard to prove, here.

We seemed to suggest here that 2) there appeared to be at least however, some potential for a future word, before the word of God. If nothing else, God himself existed before his utterance.

Though 3) to be sure, some might say that those potentialities did not become full-fledged realities, unless or until the word was uttered … and material physical things – including scripture – came into existence.

But if so, then which of the very early moments, included hints of 4) specifically “righteousness”? A few perhaps. Though none seemed apparent within the rather featureless “one.”

Indeed, the use of “one” appeared to be rather deliberately opaque; a “apophatic” term; designed to end all our merely human and flawed descriptions of God? In the end, God is so complex, that all our human discussions of him will always be simplistic and misrepresentative. Therefore in many eras, it was simply illegal to even mention the word “God” in public. And presenting an opaque and featureless “one” is … one way of ending our own flawed characterizations.

Though to be sure, since many people have already floated many inexact ideas of God, and those ideas already dominate the world today, we have no choice but to continue the dialogue. And continue to try, in our human way, to describe God.

Positing God as an opaque, “One,” about which nothing could – or even should – be said, would make all of Theology impossible; all sermons impossible. Therefore, let us more on, past that.

If you’d like to create a link connect our Helm discussion on Helm’s website, that might get some interesting feedback and be helpful. Or let Helm know that this discussion exists.

One is not truly righteous, until one proves it, by making it manifest. Until then, it exists as a mere unrealized potentiality, but not a reality.

Or in part, the problem here is really the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle complained that Plato spoke of ideal forms existing independently of real things; as if there was a sort of “perfect circle” Form, floating in space. Independent of all the circles that exist in round things; or the tendencies of real objects to lump into circular planets in space. Whereas, Aristotle might suggest, circles and all other forms, exist only as … qualities, attributes, of objects. And have no existence independently of them.

Surely there is enough analytical cross-over and common ground, between “love” and “justice” and so forth, to logically imply “righteousness.”

Though would they fully imply, just by themselves, exactly what was more fully specified, by doctrines of specifically, covenant righteousness? Probably not.

In the meantime, Edwards was probably merely invoking the reality of an at least near-”tautology”: anything to be righteous, must have had the capacity to be, or the quality of being, righteous.

To make rocks, you must have had a rock-making capability in you already.

Though again, the capability to be “Righteous” would not have to be named specifically, and found in his essence specifically and explicitly named as “righteousness”; it might indeed be discovered within, or analytically derived from, other terms associated with the essence of God; e.g. “love”ing, “just,” etc..

Though still, there would likely be some things in such an analytical picture, that would be different from, and not even linked to, the fuller description of righteousness, defined as loyalty to covenantal agreements.

For example: if you love someone, you might not hold him or her to the “letter” of this or that contract that you made with them.

Therefore, again, the righteousness of “love,” and “covenant” faithfulness, are not quite the same; and are often even in direct conflict.

If this makes any sense?

If it is true that 1) God does not properly have “attributes,” but 2) we only apply attributions to him; 3) yet at the same time, you suggest, these attributions might after all reflect realistically on something God is? Then … 4) doesn’t the third point contradict the first two? And regarding the 3rd point, 5) isn’t this whole methological discussion therefore moot? Since somehow, we seem, even by our attributions, to say something real about God? So why don’t we just go on talking about him here?

As for “righteousness,” I am indeed toying with the idea that not just God, and not just persons, but even objects – even rocks – might have this quality. Nature is full of objects … that assert their nature, and a series of laws. Perhaps these laws are more “righteous” than we thought; though they do not conform to present human ideas of justice.

It’s interesting to think of Natural Law here.

Or say, of the moment when Jesus was tempted to throw himself from a high place in the temple, so as not to … deny the justice and righteousness of gravity, the laws of nature and nature’s God; and the justice, the righteous reality, of the rocks below.

Jesus of course, declined this temptation. His stated reason was to avoid tempting God’s patience by rash acts; but perhaps after all deeper down, this in turn meant testing God’s patience … by denying the justice – righteousness – of the Nature, and the natural law(s), that God himself after all, made.

Perhaps Nature, cold as it seems, being made by God, is an expression of his justice and righteousness after all.

Though here we have a sense of righteousness and justice that does not conform to present human ethical theories, to be sure.

Re: “simple” as apophatic term, it begs the question, can an apophatic term be considered an attribute? If we define God by what God is *not*, haven’t we still defined God?

I realize this is getting off topic a bit, so I’ll ask another question, which is related: Could “righteousness” be viewed apophatically? Just pondering….

Obviously, speaking of God as just “one,” undifferentiated, and having no real properities etc., would leave us with nothing further to say about him. We can say God is “one,” or maybe “simple” … but then at that point we will have exhausted the entire descriptive vocabulary. Nothing else can be said about his oneness.

So regarding God as “one and nothing else, seems quite, quite sterile. It becomes impossible to know God, except as the supremely empty digit.

I prefer the Platonic/Paremenidean construction, that speaks of the “one” and the “many”; both existing at the same time.

Indeed in any case, the Bible begins assigning countless attributes to God; so if we are examining the Biblical god, then … the One will not quite do.

To be sure, when we go looking for God’s metaphysical nature, its tempting to look for an overarching unifier, that would bring in everthing. But that in itself is quite impoverishing.

So after that? What about say, commonly attributed things: like omnipresence, or omnipotence, as creator of the universe? Can we get covenant righteousness out of that?

The reason for this concern is that some feel 1) covenant-based theology is not holding up well, to critical scrutiny; or in any case 2) feel that covenantial theology should be consistent with what we know or think about the metaphysical nature of God as well. For the sake of consistency.

But the question again: can we do this? Can we for example get to “righteousness,” just from an examination of the “essence” of God?

One possibility: a creator of the universe, or an omnipotent being (semi-metaphysical things), would have to be respected, for his or her or its, great power. But would such a being be “righteous”? Can we therefore really get to the same point, or to righteousness, straight out of the essential nature of God? Without the legalisms of covenants?

It would seem difficult. We might see a being that created the universe as powerful. But righteous? Just? Many would not say that the Nature, the physical universe he created, is just or righteous; the “good” perish with the guilty; the rain falls on the just and the unjust.

And is there anything intrinsic just to powerfulness, that makes it logically equivalent to righteousness?

Except maybe the old California sense, of a “righteous automobile,” or “righteous weed”; that is the only construction I can think of, that equates simple power with righteousness.

Otherwise, for now, righteousness seems to exist so far, only in the framework of – rather human – legal contracts and covenants: we agree to do something for a Lord, in exchange for his promised benefits.

In so far as the western tradition tends to be dominated by, structured by and influenced by Augustine, this will be true. Just look at representative statements and theologians on divine unity and simplicity from Augustine forward among the Latins and Franks up to and through the Reformation period through Barth.

For Augustine, just read On the Trinity, bks 1-6. He’s pretty clear. If his view isn’t the dominant view, that is if it doesn’t count as the western tradition in a meaningful sense, then neither is the Trinity. The different scholastic glosses are glosses of Augustine’s view.

For the post-Reformation period, just read Muller for yourself and see.

Simplicity is an apophatic term, no matter what gloss one gives. It is like God being immaterial or atemporal, etc. It is a denial of limitation.

If we follow Helm for example and take righteousness as grounded in the essence, why then do we require a created righteousness rather than the eternal righteousness of Christ? And can a contingent created merit really stand up before God’s judgment? Why have a covenant of works at all?