Ultimately, I think you’ve got something.

For purposes of the present argument, I’ve been foregrounding/over-emphasizing the implacable and divine/eternal side of God. And for that matter, the divine side in men. But eventually, recognizing our own human side – living at least in part, in conventional Time, etc. – is extremely important. For that matter, seeing SOME of the human, and conventional time and space to some extent, even in God too, is essential.

Acknowledging SOME importance of conventional space and time to some extent, even in God’s nature too – IS probably the answer. In response to Aquinas, and the problem of Determinism vs. Free Will? A similar movement – in this case, humanizing God, say; seeing him as more human, less determining – helps a lot. Seeing the human side of God has been a major theme of this blog in fact.

The fact is, an absolutely, implacably perfect and all-determining God, is inconsistent with contingency. And it is inconsistent with the degree freedom that other parts of the Bible – and our everyday life as humans – demands.

We need a God that at least understands a human perspective. Some Christians assert that when God became man, became “flesh” in Jesus, we began to see that. Though even still MORE emphasis on the human side of God, now seems advisable.

Your own logical outline of how we might be allowed to be human, existing at least in PART, in conventional time – and of God understanding/comprehending human qualities? – seems very useful to our larger project.

Remember, “God’s way” is normally at least a metaphor for the absolute Truth; as opposed to human illusion and delusion and provinciality.

So if men see things spatially, for example, but we could to some small degree (with help) transcend our normal human limits or prejudices, and somehow see part of God’s Way, that somehow say dissolves spatiality (as we might in some theology, and post-Einsteinian physics), then shouldn’t we prefer God’s Way?

Or, even if we want to follow Man rather than God, shouldn’t we prefer the most profound of man’s thoughts (say Einsteinian thoughts), to normal cliches and human prejudices?

Do we really want to say that between the ways (and thought patterns) of Man and the ways of God or the larger, Ultimate Truth, we should prefer the ways of Man?

And of course, God’s vision of any given thing sees it better, even in its ontology, than we do.

While by the way, to see just the “thing itself” (Kant’s “ding an such?” SP?), would be to fail not only to see it as a part of God’s plan, but also to fail to see it as part of the larger natural system.

Specifically, in fact, conventional theology suggests that our normal perspective of time IS flawed; and that our temporal “deaths” are illusions for example; there being some sort of afterlife in God’s realm; in… eternity. So that the Bible itself urges us to see things Sub Species Eternis.

Thanks for your response. I think you’re tracking with one of the key distinctions: the way in which God knows something is not to be confused with the ontology of the thing in itself.

First, thanks for a really nice post on a great topic.

Second, I think (I could be way off here–I’ve only skimmed the comments) Brett may be committed to something like the following (this could be put much more accurately, but that would require a bit more jargon):

(GWK) God’s Way of Knowing (or God’s Way of _____ing): If God knows p (or whatever) in way W, then p is W.

For example, Brett says: “God sees everything not from the point of view of time, or past progressing to future, but seen “from aeternity”; from a timeless point of view. In which present and past are illusory, or simultaneous.”

That is, Since God knows us timeless, we must be timeless–i.e. past and present are illusory; everything is timeless. But GWK is a false principle. For example, God knows us non-spatially, so we are non-spatial. Or God knows us in a sinless way (God’s way of knowing is sinless) so we must be sinless. Or…. You get the idea. Now Brett may have reasons to think that in the timeless case things are different. But, so far as I can tell, the principle is false and the stuff about God’s timelessly knowing stuff does not imply that that stuff is timeless. More argument/reasons need to be given to get us to that conclusion.

Perhaps, Duby’s Aquinas seems to hint next, contingency exists somehow. IN say, this: the distinction between God in the past, seeing future things as potential; versus the moment when things God saw in the past, are realized finally real physical events, in actuality (or something)?

So for example: God might have known in his mind, in our Dec. 22, 1425, that on Jan. 21, 2010, Bill Harris was going to hit a home run. And some migth claim, this all existed merely as a past thought, an expectation by God; it was only a half reality, even a contingency; that was not realize, until it actually happened, in physical reality, Jan 21, 2010.

But if that is what Duby/Aquinas meant? Then we will argue here, that last idea does not work. There is in fact, no contingency ANYWHERE, within a God seen as all powerful and all knowing/ sub species aeternis.

First, of course, 1) it is right we first consider not the human perspective, but God himself. We should attempt understanding the view not of fallible men, but of God himself, insofar as that is possible. And try to find an allowance for contingency, the unexpected, freedom, there: in God himself.

And to some extent, surprisingly, Duby/Aquinas suggests 2) we can move on to see SOME of God’s own view. God’s view, it is said, must be sub species aeternis; God sees everything not from the point of view of time, or past progressing to future, but seen “from aeternity”; from a timeless point of view. In which present and past are illusory, or simultaneous. God from the very start, in our “past,” already knew the future.

But here’s the problem: if God already long ago, knew what was going to happen, if indeed he even long ago determined everything that was going to happen, how is it that anything can be unexpected or “contingent” to him? Or, indeed, since everything was planned by God long ago, how can anything today be really free in reality?

Indeed, it is precisely in the perspective of Sub Species Aeternis, that nothing is every really unknown, or up for grabs, or free. Even long ago in the “past,” still God always knews in advance what was going to happen. So that nothing is really contingent, or a surprise, for God himself. Long ago, from the beginning, God’s Plan for the “future” was known and set; so that nothing can be a surprise, or a contingency, for God.

But to be sure, 3) NEXT Duby’s Aquinas argues, in his latest objection, that this is not true; that somehow there IS some kind of contingency, deviation from the plan, even within “God’s” view, sub species. But where and how? Here things get vague. But roughly: God lived and thought in the past, and for him things WERE future, and contingent? They were mere ideas in his mind; not physical realities.

But still, we object here, there is really no “past” for God, or “future” either. All time exists simultaneously for God. SO in the “past,” God will have known the future. So that still, there is no contingency or surprise for God; not here.

Duby seemed to suggest, in his latest note, that from the perspective of God in the past, things APPEAR contingent or future; as opposed to the later moment when the vision fo them appearing, actually HAPPEN. When they are obviously, no LONGER contingent. (Since they are now actual & decided facts). So for example: God might have an idea in his head of Bill Jones hitting a homerun, tomorrow; but it is only an idea, until tomorrow, when Jones actually hits the ball, and it becomes an event in physical reality. But so what? Still, God knew it was going to happen before it happened; there was no surprise for God here. Nothing unknown. Nothing contingent. The plan, the script that was already known, was merely being played out; with no surprises, for God.

One might next suggest that something that existed only as an idea in the mind of God, was not quite real. And so God experiences at least some sort of transition from a past expectation, to a future reality; and some kind of uncertainty there? But remember, though at some point the plan of God for the future was “merely” a plan or idea in the mind of God, and only later became a physical reality, still, God knew it was coming. It was not unanticipated; or even free. It was determined long ago.

Or for that matter, note that the material future existed at least, as an idea in the mind of God. While surely, an idea in the mind of God must still be quite real?

So that here, still, there was no really significant moment of transition for God himself; not in the move from any kind of vague past, or early mental idea, to a material future. No contingency here, either. The transition from a “past” idea of God, to a future actual material act, does not involve any really unexpected moments; no contingency. First, the plans of God, the ideas in the mind of God, are themselves real enough. Next, the plans of an all-powerful God always come true. So there is no room for surprise – or contingency – here either.

So where again, Duby Aquinas, does God experience or allow, contingency? Many things APPEAR, from a conventional human perspective, to be contingent, unplanned, unexpected; to human beings. But not to God.

Contingency? Not here either. And since God is ultimate reality, and God is everywhere and in “all things,” then therefore, there is in the all-powerful model of God, no room anywhere in the reality in which we live, on earth, for any REAL chance or freedom.

We might like to wistfully think or hope, that somehow God understands or has, the human sensation of not knowing the future. That God is experiencing freedom, surprise, contingency. And indeed, he might undestand that. But does he every himself really EXPERIENCE that human situation fully himself? Or does real freedom actually exist, if God is all powerful?

Actually, if God is all powerful, there is never a moment God does not know the future; or when an unexpected event occurs for him. So that there is no contingency for God himself. Nor is there any real freedom in the universe, if God is all-powerful: we are all only following a script, a plan, set long ago, “from the beginning.” They moments when we THINK we are freely acting out of choice, are illusory; all was set in strone. Long ago, God knew and planned, what our “free” choice would be.

These are the logical implications, if God is all powerful and all knowing. We might hope, wistfully, that God allows a very real freedom – as indeed, JR, other parts of the Bible suggest. But the point here is that if we accept the common vision of God, as all-powerful and all knowing, sub species aeternis, that model does not seem compatible with freedom at all.

Finally to be sure, parts of the Bible seem to promise freedom. So what should we now say? Scholars say that simply means that there is simply a contradiction between the (biblical?) ideas of a) God as all powerful, versus b) the model of him, that allows human beings to have free will.

So what should we do? Most scholars feel today that we must either reject the a) parts of the Bible that present God as all-powerful; or we must reject the b) other parts, that seem to promise freedom. Since these two models of God are mutually irreconcilable.

EITHER God is all-powerful, and knows and determines all things in advance; OR he allows freedom. Logically, many think today, he cannot do both. These two different ideas of God, both found in the Bible itself, cannot be reconciled with each other.

To be sure, if we could find some way God could be all-powerful, and yet allow freedom, “contingency,” that might fix this. But so far, no one has managed to find out how that could be possible.

Thanks for your response here. I have thought about working to correlate some of Aquinas’ insights with Calvin’s view of divine providence, but I haven’t thought about this in relation to the concept of irresistible grace in particular. Crossway just recently published a highly accessible translation of Calvin’s The Secret Providence of God and I think that it would definitely be worthwhile, at least for my own theological exploration, to spend some more time in dialogue with both Aquinas and Calvin as resources on the subject of divine sovereignty and human freedom.

Brett,

You’re working with too crude a distinction here. For Aquinas, it’s not the case that contingent things simply have no contingency with respect to God but do have contingency with respect to us. With only the former in view (the question of contingency with respect to God), there is a distinction between a thing as God considers it in his own knowledge and as God considers it in itself, under which perspective the thing is indeed contingent in God’s sight.

My point here is that 2) however, among other arguments, this very argument does not redeem contingency, but utterly defeats it. Since now, in the eyes of God himself, there is no such thing as contingency.

And there being no such thing as contingency, then God’s determining nature does not work, as Duby/Aquinas concludes, with or through contingency. But rather the argument actuallydemon strates that contingency is a human illusion – or finally, that contingency is really something that does not exist.

Still leaving us – as critics note – with a view of an all-determining God, after all; in which there is no real contingency … and no real freedom.

As a result, I think, these folks become reductionistic in their attempts to understand God’s future contingent knowledge in largely anthropomorphic terms. I humbly submit that Brettongarcia falls prey to this same kind of reductionism in positing a false “incompatibility” of God’s future contingent knowledge with human free will. I find Thomas’ article “freeing” in this regard and would personally enjoy seeing further exploration, Steve.

Another question for further discussion might be how the classical Calvinist doctrine of irresistible grace might or might not relate to God’s future contingent knowledge in Aquinas’ view.